THE SECOND CIRCUIT: WHERE JUDGES CAN DO WHATEVER THE FUCK THEY WANT
Updated: May 9
"Fascism equals corporatism because it is a merger of state and corporate power” ― Benito Mussolini
This is Part II of the series covering the persecution of human rights lawyer Steven Donziger. Please read Part I before reading this.
THE ROARING 80s
It was the roaring 80s – sort of like the roaring 2016 - Covid; except with good music. America didn’t make anything real. We made money by playing money games. Corporations got big tax breaks that they put into the stock market or they hid away or spent on lavish parties where they served the meat of endangered lions. Budget deficits ballooned. We didn’t have cell phones to worship. MTV played music. The Amazon Rain Forest still existed although Sting was warning us that it would soon be gone if we didn't stop the destruction. It was the era of Caligula like the one we are going through right now.
There were schemes, cocaine, mergers and acquisitions, LBOs, and spinoffs; and plenty of Rolex slinging, tough-guy, slick lawyers all over Wall Street. It was the Wild West for punks.
THE ROOTS OF STEVEN DONZIGER’S PLIGHT
The important case before the Second Circuit was In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2nd Cir. October 31, 1988, Argued; November 15, 1988, Decided) A monumental decision. But nobody knew it.
It is the Dredd Scott of judicial corruption and judicial bias decisions.
The full caption was:
IN RE DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT INCORPORATED, DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT GROUP INCORPORATED, MICHAEL R. MILKEN, LOWELL J. MILKEN, CARY J. MAULTASCH, and PAMELA R. MONZERT, Petitioners. IN RE IVAN F. BOESKY SECURITIES LITIGATION. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT INCORPORATED, DREXEL BURNHAM LAMBERT GROUP INCORPORATED, MICHAEL R. MILKEN, LOWELL J. MILKEN, CARY J. MAULTASCH, and PAMELA MONZERT, Defendants The names Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken may ring a bell. They were basically connected versions of Bernie Madoff that did worse, but paid less in time for it. I think they dressed better than Bernie Madoff.
Here is the proposition that this all important decision stood for: Any judge sitting anywhere in the Second Circuit ... Hang on a second ... What is the Second Circuit? According to the Second Circuit:
The United States District Courts for the Second Circuit exercise federal jurisdiction in six districts within the states of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont. These are the trial courts for the circuit. Each district has multiple seats of court: District of Connecticut (New Haven, Hartford, Bridgeport); Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn, Central Islip); Northern District of New York (Albany, Binghamton, Plattsburgh, Syracuse, Utica); Southern District of New York (Manhattan, White Plains); Western District of New York (Buffalo, Rochester); District of Vermont (Burlington, Rutland, Brattleboro)”
– Any Judge sitting in these multiple Court Houses is above the law.
I will get more precise.
This is the precise holding of the Second Circuit – in all of their haughty wisdom and grandeur – in the monumental decision of In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2nd Cir. 1988):
Any Judge in the Second Circuit can do whatever the fuck they want.
Any Judge in the Second Circuit can do whatever the fuck they want.
I literally mean whatever the fuck they want. They could pull a Trump and shoot someone on Fifth Avenue – and get away with it – unless someone shoots them back. But as far as the law is concerned – it is cool to shoot someone … if you are a Second Circuit Judge … in broad daylight … in the middle of Fifth Avenue … while getting head from a hooker. (I am so sorry I can no longer write respectfully as a lawyer should. The Donziger matter was the last straw)
And as I know … And as Steven Donziger knows with far worse consequences then I ever faced – it is even more true today; in a time where the Amazon has become so fucked up it no longer eats Carbon but it emits Carbon; thereby hastening the day when the grandchildren of all intelligent people will have their lives ruined by climate change – not to worry because the grandchildren of abject idiots, asshole judges, and punk corporate lawyers will too suffer the same fate. Even the grand children of corporate killers like Chevron will suffer.
In Drexel according to the decision itself:
A petition for a writ of mandamus has been filed by Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated, et al. seeking the recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 of Senior United States District Court Judge Milton Pollack on the grounds that he is disqualified from presiding over pending civil fraud actions, which name petitioners as defendants. The underlying actions against petitioners were instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 7, 1988, and earlier by individual and class action plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed opposition papers to the issuance of the writ.
Milton Pollack was the SDNY super stud. The Ayatollah of Rock n' Rolla. He handled multiple cases of insider trading. He received glowing reviews by such publications as the New York Times: a Judge who was quick to lose his temper, issue sanctions, keep everyone in line and get things done. In the days where Rudy Giuliani was a hero so was Milton Pollack. "Eight hour days. Dinner. And then pouring over cases" boasted the New York Times of Pollack. A news paper that perhaps should now be ignored.
He Almost Looked Like a Nice Guy
But Pollack, like Giuliani, was a psycho.
A Uniquely American Idiot
What did the Second Circuit do? In an opinion written by Judge Cardamone the Court did this:
The court denied petitioner corporations' request for a writ of mandamus ordering a senior district judge recused in a case where they were defendants on three separate bases under 28 U.S.C.S. § 455(a) because his impartiality might gave reasonably been questioned by reason of his wife's substantial interest in a transaction. Also, the judge's personal attacks on defense counsel's integrity purportedly reflect bias and accentuate the alleged appearance of existing impartiality and under § 455(b)(4) because his wife had a financial or other interest that could have been substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings. The court held that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to recuse himself because his wife had no business or other dealings in the transaction nor would she receive money. The court held there was no nexus, direct, indirect or otherwise, between the civil suits pending before the judge and his wife's interest in the transaction. The court found the judge's connection too remote to mandate recusal because one petitioner had no direct or indirect obligation to his wife.
Cardamone, who must have mentored Judge Kaplan -- the Chevron chief persecutor of Steven Donziger -- wrote the following intellectually dishonest introduction. Bear in mind in talking of “smoke” Cardamone blows more smoke than a burning rain forest set afire by flatulent oil companies. Cardamone like a tobacco company lawyer, arguing that cigarettes are not really dangerous, minimizes an extremely huge conflict of interest. Furthermore he fucks up the test for when a judge must remove himself from a case.
A petition for a writ of mandamus has been presented seeking the disqualification of Senior United States District Court Judge Milton Pollack from presiding over certain civil fraud actions arising from claims of illegal insider trading. One action has been instituted by the plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) against the present petitioners, defendants Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated, Drexel Burnham Group Incorporated, Michael R. Milken, Lowell J. Milken, Cary J. Maultasch, and Pamela R. Monzert (Drexel). The other action is an amalgam of similar consolidated civil fraud actions instituted by individual plaintiffs that include the Drexel corporations as named defendants. Plaintiffs in both of these pending civil suits have appeared in opposition and have filed responses to Drexel's petition.
It is axiomatic that a judge may not preside over a case when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. [It is axiomatic for all except the Second Circuit] In deciding the sensitive question of whether to recuse a judge, the test of impartiality is what a reasonable person, knowing and understanding all the facts and circumstances, would believe. It is for that reason that we cannot adopt a per se rule holding that when someone claims to see smoke, we must find that there is fire. That which is seen is sometimes merely a smokescreen. Judicial inquiry may not therefore be defined by what appears in the press. If such were the case, those litigants fortunate enough to have easy access to the media could make charges against a judge's impartiality that would effectively veto the assignment of judges. Judge-shopping would then become an additional and potent tactical weapon in the skilled practitioner's arsenal. Instead, the sensitive issue of whether a judge should be disqualified requires a careful examination of those relevant facts and circumstances to determine whether the charges reasonably bring into question a judge's impartiality.
First what a crock of shit as we will see momentarily. Moreover Cardamone is a real horse's ass because the test is one of smoke and assume fire. Specifically it is not impropriety (Fire) that demands recusal, but the mere appearance of impropriety (Smoke) that warrants recusal.
But first here are the procedural facts:
In December 1986, 11 shareholders' class action suits alleging injury as a result of insider trading were brought against Ivan Boesky and others, including Drexel Burnham agents. These actions were filed in the Southern District of New York and in the Northern and Central Districts of California. The suits brought in the Southern District of New York were assigned to Judge Pollack. In March of 1987 an additional civil fraud action, in which Drexel was also a named defendant, styled Arden Way Associates, et al. v. Ivan F. Boesky, et al., (Arden Way), was begun in the Southern District. The two Drexel corporations were represented in these suits by Cahill Gordon & Reindel (Cahill Gordon) of New York City. As a result of the multiple claims asserted in these related class and individual actions, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, on July 24, 1987, brought together all the pending actions, including Arden Way, in the Southern District of New York for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). This request to transfer was addressed to Southern District Chief Judge Brieant with a suggestion that all of the class and non-class actions be assigned to Judge Pollack. An order consenting to the transfer was filed on August 5, 1987. The entire group of cases are referred to as "In re Ivan F. Boesky Securities Litigation" (Boesky Litigation) and charged Drexel, along with other defendants, with acting in concert with Boesky and his affiliated companies to violate the securities and civil anti-racketeering laws of the United States.
That much of Judge Cardamone’ decision is true. And it sounds eerily familiar. This massive case just happens to land in the lap of Judge Pollack like the Donziger case just happened to land in the lap of Kaplan and Preska. Kaplan’s old firm of Paul Weiss actually represented some crooked individuals in this case. Judge Kaplan may have taken time out from unsuccessfully telling juries that cigarettes were healthy to participate in the case.
In 1988 Palais Royal, Inc., a closely held corporation operating a retail chain in Texas entered into negotiations to sell its business in a leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction. The stockholders include Mrs. Moselle Pollack and members of her family. Mrs. Pollack, who is Judge Pollack's wife, is a controlling stockholder.
From this point onward Cardamone manipulates, massages, ignores, and complicates the facts. Cardamone, a Reagan appointee, looked like a Utica mobster and fancied himself as somewhat of a poet that was an expert in the trivialization of all that is important. For instance Cardamone began his opinion in Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2006) by noting a defendant's connection to a classic American short story:
The case before us on this appeal has as one of the named defendants the Village of Sleepy Hollow (Village), a small municipality located on the banks of the Hudson River in Westchester County, New York. The very name Sleepy Hollow evokes shades of the Headless Horseman, Ichabod Crane, and Katrina Van Tassel-all fictional figures made famous by Washington Irving in The Legend of Sleepy Hollow (Wildside Press 2004) (1917). According to the legend, the Headless Horseman haunts this tranquil village. Its ghost is reportedly responsible for numerous frightful encounters, including one in which the specter scared the schoolmaster, Ichabod Crane, out of town. In this case we do not deal with a headless horseman, but with discord of another kind-the alleged discriminatory treatment faced by plaintiffs, two female employees of the Village.
— Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2006)
And so Cardamone alludes that the claims of discrimination are a fairy tail. What a dick.
Cardamone: The Utica Godfather of Judicial Bias
THE LAW AS IT SHOULD BE
Well we’re done with Cardamone. Here is all we need to know about In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.:
Drexel had been retained by a firm which was under contract with Mrs. Pollack – Judge Pollack’s wife – and members of her family -- to arrange financing for the cash purchase of Palais Royal. Palais Royal was the Mrs. Pollack family business. At the completion of the deal – which depended on Drexel – members of the Mrs. Pollack’s family would receive over $84,000,000 million dollars. Mrs. Pollack herself, as trustee, would receive $30,000,000 million in cash.
What did Cardamone say earlier: “It is axiomatic that a judge may not preside over a case when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
Well I would assume that if Judge Pollack’s wife is getting $30,000,000 million dollars Judge Pollack might enjoy some of that money. Perhaps his dinners after his grinding 8 hour work day would have been a bit more expensive. In the late 80s $30,000,000 dollars was a lot of money. It still is.
One of the parties said "hey wait a minute judge ... your impartiality is reasonably questioned by reason of your wife's substantial interest in a transaction before this Court; and also your personal attacks on our integrity which accentuate the appearance of existing impartiality ... because your wife has a financial interest that could have been substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings."
In other words judge you can really extort us into giving your wife's family almost 100 million dollars. "Judge let me talk like you ... you can fuck us up."
So an honorable man would have said “folks my impartiality might reasonably be questioned. I cannot be involved in this case as it effects whether or not me and my wife will get $30,000,000 dollars.”
But few honorable men or women sit on the bench of the Southern District of New York or the Second Circuit with one notable exception.
There was a judge who wrote a strong dissenting opinion.
Judges are painfully civil to each other. Even in the moral outrage of the Dredd Scott decision -- where African Americans were held not to be humans but rather property -- had a friendly dissent. A sort of “I say my good man, I believe you may be mistaken.”
I dissent, therefore, from that part of the opinion of the majority of the court, in which it is held that a person of African descent cannot be a citizen of the United States; and I regret I must go further, and dissent both from what I deem their assumption of authority to examine the constitutionality of the act of Congress commonly called the Missouri compromise act, and the grounds and conclusions announced in their opinion.
Dred Scott V. Sanford (1857) Nice and civil dissenting Opinion (Justice Benjamin Curtis)
So with the above in mind when you read the dissent in the Drexel case you will understand that Judge Lumbard was pretty upset. I present the dissent almost in full. It is a pity for Steven Donziger that Judge Lumbard is gone:
Dissent by: LUMBARD
LUMBARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
We should grant the writ of mandamus and direct Judge Pollack to recuse himself from consideration of these cases.
To me, the inescapable relevant fact is that Drexel has been, and is now, retained by the firm which is under contract with Mrs. Pollack and members of her family to arrange financing for the cash purchase of Palais Royal, their family business, from which members of the family will receive over $ 84 million and Mrs. Pollack herself, and as trustee, will receive $ 30 million in cash. It is clear to me that a reasonable person knowing these ultimate conceded facts would reasonably question Judge Pollack's ability to supervise such litigation impartially. Such a reasonable person's next question would be "Why hasn't the judge stepped aside?" Moreover, Judge Pollack's expressed resentment to the suggestion of recusal and his castigation of Drexel and its counsel has confirmed these doubts. He cannot act impartially in these cases.
Next Lumbard attacks the Cardamone smoke screen:
There is absolutely no evidence that Drexel agreed to act for Bain in order to manufacture a situation in which Judge Pollack's continued participation in ongoing litigation could be challenged. Drexel became involved in the Palais Royal deal in the same manner in which it might become involved in any of its deals. First, the stockholders of Palais Royal, consisting of Mrs. Pollack and family members, agreed on June 29, 1988 to sell the company to Bain Venture Capital (Bain) for over $ 84 million, on condition that Bain obtain financing for the purchase. Thereafter, Bain arranged with Drexel to obtain the necessary financing for the purchase of Palais Royal and another business with which Palais Royal is to be merged, in what is known as a leveraged buyout (LBO). It is undisputed that Bain sought out Drexel, a leading company in the successful and profitable managing of LBOs; Drexel did not seek to create a disqualification issue.
Here Lumbard attacks Cardamone’s puerile “what if” smoke:
Moreover, there is no evidence that Drexel is not committed to this transaction. Although the majority suggests that Drexel may not be contractually obligated to Bain, the evidence before us leads to the opposite conclusion. The majority's attempt to deemphasize the nexus between Palais Royal and the instant litigation by hypothesizing that a court conceivably might find Drexel uncommitted to Bain is to brush aside both the uncontroverted evidence and the reasonableness standard of § 455(a). Drexel already has agreed to supply in excess of $ 200,000,000; it has completed an extensive "due diligence" investigation. It also has an option to purchase 15% of the acquiring company. Although the June agreement fixes no closing date, the parties expect to close the deal sometime in November 1988.
Lumbard in what follows attacks some more of Cardamone’s bullshit:
The record is similarly devoid of any evidence which suggests that Drexel waited until an opportune moment to "discover" the conflict. On September 7, 1988, the SEC filed suit against Drexel and four of its principals seeking injunctive relief and disgorgement of profits. On the SEC's suggestion that this new action was related to other civil suits already supervised by Judge Pollack, it was assigned to him. Two days later, on September 9, Bain advised Cahill Gordon & Reindel (Cahill Gordon), Drexel's counsel, that the Moselle Pollack who had signed the agreement with Bain and who had a $ 30 million interest in the Palais Royal buyout was the wife of Judge Pollack. Drexel's attorney informed Judge Pollack by telephone on the very next day of Mrs. Pollack's interest in the deal.
When it became known to counsel for Drexel that the Moselle Pollack who would benefit from the buyout was the wife of Judge Pollack, the judge conducting the cases involving Drexel, it was their duty to bring the matter to the judge's attention without delay. The duty to inform a judge of a potential conflict rests upon whichever party becomes aware of such a situation. Any feelings which either party may have about the judge's favoring one or the other are wholly immaterial. To save embarrassment, time and expense, and the validity of any judgment, counsel have a duty to act promptly.
According to the undisputed evidence in the record before us, the Cahill Gordon attorneys who were representing Drexel in these cases did not know until September 9 that Moselle Pollack was the wife of Judge Pollack. Different attorneys in the firm had been representing Mrs. Pollack in her negotiations for the sale of Palais Royal, and nothing in the record indicates that anyone at Cahill Gordon knew of the link before September 9. If, as the SEC suggests, Drexel was anxious to get Judge Pollack out of these cases, it would seem that someone at Cahill Gordon would have acted as soon as the firm became aware that the judge was Moselle Pollack's husband. In sum, there is no reason to believe that Cahill Gordon could have acted any sooner than it did.
Lumbard points out that Judge Pollack was not about to lose out on $30,000,000 dollars. Not if Pollack could help it:
At this point in the proceedings, Judge Pollack's resentment at the idea of recusal became apparent. After conference with counsel in his chambers on September 13, Judge Pollack refused to consider recusal. He called the suggestion a "cockamamie story" and threatened counsel with sanctions for acting on "insufficient information."
On September 20, the petitioners filed a formal motion to recuse, returnable October 4, which Judge Pollack adjourned to October 11th. As the judge continued to rule on pretrial matters in the private civil cases, the petitioners sought a writ of mandamus on September 30. We denied the petition as premature in view of the hearing scheduled for October 11.
Meanwhile, on October 10, the day before he was to hear the recusal motion, Judge Pollack, on his own motion, issued an order directing Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (Paul, Weiss) [there you go – Judge Kaplan’s firm], which represents Michael R. Milken [One of the worst corporate criminals], a top Drexel official involved in the SEC litigation and the petition for recusal, and two of its partners, Arthur Liman and Martin Flumenbaum, to show cause why "they should not be required to identify and withdraw the papers on said disqualification motion which they have drafted, filed and served herein." With the order, Judge Pollack served copies of documents from his family's files to support his charge that, by joining in the recusal motion on behalf of the individual principals of Drexel, the Paul, Weiss firm was undertaking "conflicting" representation and acting adversely toward the Pollack family members, whom they had represented in other matters. At the October 11 hearing, Judge Pollack refused to hear argument on his order and referred the matter to Chief Judge Brieant "for disciplinary resolution, if required."
Goodness. Pollack was a crook. And this reads like the Judge Kaplan play book in the Donziger matter. Lumbard continued:
It appears from this response to the recusal motion that the judge viewed the suggestion that he recuse himself from the Drexel litigation as adverse to the interests of his family--as if his continued participation in this litigation would be favorable to those family interests
Judge Pollack's hostility towards the moving parties was repeated in his opinion of October 17. Judge Pollack emphasized the lack of "privity" between Mrs. Pollack and Drexel, writing that Mrs. Pollack's transaction "is not a Drexel-financed transaction." He also made much of the argument that Drexel is not essential to the deal and that Bain could easily retain one of Drexel's competitors to provide the required financing. In finding no reasonable basis for doubting his impartiality, Judge Pollack wrote that the "speculations" in which Drexel's lawyers engaged to "concoct" perceptions of impropriety seem so "far-fetched" as reactions of a reasonable person as to be "ludicrous".
Here is where Lumbard really gives it to the miscreants on the Second Circuit who decided this case:
My colleagues, in denying the petitioners' renewed application for mandamus, also rely upon the lack of "privity" between Mrs. Pollack and Drexel. Their argument rests on the fact that, instead of Drexel paying Mrs. Pollack with its own check for $ 30 million, Drexel will arrange the payment to a Bain subsidiary created for that purpose, which in turn will pay the $ 30 million to Mrs. Pollack. This can fool no one regarding who is responsible for raising the money and causing it to get to Mrs. Pollack. According to present plans, Mrs. Pollack will not get $ 30 million but for Drexel.
In this case, to impute a lack of privity is to exalt the form of the transaction over its substance, and to ignore the reasonableness standard of § 455(a), which requires us to judge the situation from the viewpoint of the reasonable person, and not from a purely legalistic perspective. Drexel is integrally involved in this transaction and has been so for several months. It is largely because of Drexel's efforts that Mrs. Pollack will receive $ 30 million. That is the common sense of it; and it most certainly is the public perception that Mrs. Pollack is to be paid $ 30 million thanks to Drexel.
There are arguments as to why the United States Supreme Court should take the Donziger matter – they have already refused to once before:
The Liljeberg Court squarely held that whenever a question involving disqualification is presented, it is critical promptly to examine all possible bases for the judge's disqualification. Liljeberg, supra, at 2205 ... The very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible."108 S. Ct. at 2204-05 (footnote omitted).
"Avoiding even the appearance of impropriety" -- Cardamone, you cheap thug. In the Donziger case there is far more than an appearance. There is NAZI level impropriety.
A central pillar of our government is the people's confidence that our courts are free of bias or favor and are administered by judges who are unquestionably impartial. Whenever any reasonable basis to doubt a judge's impartiality exists, this public trust demands that we act swiftly and decisively. [Emphasis added]
We should grant the petition for mandamus and direct Judge Pollack to recuse himself.
Judge Lumbard there are about 30,000 indigenous peoples in Ecuador that are coming down with cancer and suffering birth defects – and dying horrible deaths – that wish you were here. So does Mr. Donziger. (Judge Lumbard died in 1999 at the age of 97 – one of America’s best jurists and as a prosecutor a lion when it came to the prosecution of public corruption)
There Were Once Good Judges
As of this day and this very instant In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2nd Cir. 1988) is still the law of the land in the Second Circuit. It has not been overruled or treated negatively according to Lexis and Casetext. It has been cited to 434 times -- like spreading Corona Virus.
Meanwhile well over one hundred influential lawyers and organizations filed a formal complaint with Second Circuit about the persecution of Steven Donziger by Judge Kaplan:
This complaint has been filed by lawyers and lawyer’s organizations worldwide, over their increasing alarm at the punitive lengths to which Judge Kaplan has gone, beyond all bounds of reason, to destroy Steven Donziger both personally and professionally. By extension, he also appears to be blocking access to the remedy for the 30,000 indigenous clients from the Ecuadorian Amazon that Mr. Donziger has represented since 1993. Complainants are very concerned that the persecution of Mr. Donziger by Judge Kaplan and Chevron will have a chilling effect on the work of other human rights lawyers, acting as a warning of the consequences they will suffer should they try to hold major corporations accountable for their human rights violations.
The letter pulls no punches. Pay attention to one word.
After the trial in the RICO case Judge Kaplan issued a 500-page opinion in Chevron Donziger, predictably finding against Mr. Donziger and the other defendants and holding that Mr. Donziger and his Ecuadorian co-counsel had bribed the issuing judge in Ecuador, Judge Zambrano. This purported bribe was to allow the Ecuadorian plaintiffs to “ghostwrite” the judgment favorable to them. Despite Mr. Donziger and the other Ecuadorian plaintiffs’ vehement denials of any bribe, Judge Kaplan ruled this alleged bribe rendered the judgment invalid. This finding was nearly exclusively based on the testimony of a former disgraced judge, Judge Guerra, who at trial admitted he told multiple inconsistent versions of his story to Chevron before settling on the one he told at trial (and who later admitted to lying in the RICO trial itself). Judge Kaplan never reconsidered his views once knowing his judgment was based on perjured testimony. Further Judge Kaplan never considered any of the evidence in the record in Ecuador that was built over a many years, and never considered whether the record supported the Ecuadorian judgment.
After the Second Circuit predictably did not reverse the findings of fact in Judge Kaplan’s 500-page opinion as “clearly erroneous,” thus affirming the decision, Judge Kaplan imposed costs of over $800,000 on Mr. Donziger. More than 90% of these costs were the allocated costs for the Special Masters [Kaplan's former law partner] he and his clients had objected to. Lacking the funds to pay such exorbitant and unnecessary costs, Judge Kaplan issued a default judgment against him.
See the Complaint to the Second Circuit attached here. It is compelling:
These lawyers know that the Second Circuit is filled with intellectual NAZIs. Hence the word “predictably.” They are just pushing to see how brazen their criminality is.
“A central pillar of our government is the people's confidence that our courts are free of bias or favor and are administered by judges who are unquestionably impartial. Whenever any reasonable basis to doubt a judge's impartiality exists, this public trust demands that we act swiftly and decisively.” – said Judge Lumbard.
The Second Circuit has not acted swiftly and decisively to stop the destruction of Steven Donziger. The Second Circuit has not acted swiftly and decisively to bring justice to the victims of Chevron’s Genocide and Ecocide. The Biden Administration has not acted swiftly and decisively nor has our legislative bodies.
The Chevron Federalist abortion of a human -- Judge Preska -- is sending Steven Donziger to jail. That is a forgone conclusion. The Eva Braun special prosecutor Rita Glavin will slap herself on the ass and say "you go girl." She will make so much money from Chevron, but she really couldn't try her way out of a paper bag in a fair trial. And the farce that is America will continue its downward spiral into mayhem
Now we must act swiftly and decisively in any manner that the situation requires. Any manner. Nothing should be off the table. Who has the courage.
For the faint of heart of which there are multitudes – simply do not buy anything made by Chevron. If Chevron advertises on your favorite network or in your favorite publication – drop it. They cannot put you in jail for refusing to buy their gas -- not yet at least.
For those like me … I will see you on the streets.